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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
WASH-A-MATIC, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs-
WILLIS RUPP, a/k/a WILLIE RUPP, 
Defendant and Respondent, 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant sought review of a decision of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial District, Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, dismissing appellant's action for breach 
of contract against respondent. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Appellant filed the instant action against the re-
spondent on the 15th day of September, 1972, alleging 
breach of contract. An answer was duly filed and the 
matter tried on March 21, 1974, before the Honorable 
Case No. 
13688 
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Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., Judge. On the 8th day of April, 
1974, Judge Baldwin entered judgment for the respon-
dent and against plaintiff dismissing plaintiff's cause of 
action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent submits that this Court should affirm 
the trial Court's judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent submits the following Statement of Facts 
as being more in keeping with the proposition that on 
appeal the facts will be reviewed in a light most favorable 
to the trial Court's verdict. 
The appellant's complaint alleged that on or about 
the 5th day of August, 1971, appellant and respondent 
entered into a written contract for the purchase, by re-
spondent, of a car wash and related equipment (R. 53). 
Appellant further alleged that the equipment was de-
livered to the respondent pursuant to the contract which 
was refused and that as a result appellant sustained 
damages. 
Mr, Bert Nelson, a service representative for Nelson 
Service and Livingston, received information from a friend 
that the respondent might be interested in a car wash 
(R. 60). Mr. Nelson met with Mr. Rupp in the summer 
of 1971. Rupp indicated he was interested. In view of the 
type of car wash in which Rupp had an interest, Mr. 
Nelson felt it would be best to contact Mr. Jack Thur-
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mond of Wash-A-Matic, the appellant (R. 61). Mr. 
Thurmond received word from Nelson that Rupp may be 
a good car wash prospect (R. 70). Mr. Thurmond met 
with Rupp at his office and discussed the pros and cons 
of a car wash operation. Initially they did not discuss 
cost but merely equipment that might be reasonable for 
the location at 4700 South Redwood Road (R. 71). Rupp 
was of the opinion that he did not have any zoning 
problems because there had been an auto wrecking yard 
at the site previously (R. 135). Several days later, Nel-
son and Thurmond again met at Rupp's office and dis-
cussed various means of financing with one means being 
leasing of the car wash to be obtained through Wash-A-
Matic, through Capitol Goods and Leasing Company (R. 
72). Alternative locations were considered and a Mr. 
Martin of Equipment Leasing later also examined Rupp's 
property but no arrangements were made at that time 
for any lease (R. 75). There was also discussion about 
obtaining financing locally either through a bank or 
through a leasing company (R. 153, 72). 
On October 5, 1971, Rupp executed an order for equip-
ment (Exhibit P-l). That order expressly provided that 
it was "subject to financing and equipment selection" 
and that the $200 check given at the time of the execu-
tion of the order was refundable if financing was not ar-
ranged. Exhibit 1-P also provided: 
This contract is contingent upon the avail-
ability to the purchaser of financing as set 
forth on the front of this contract. Upon ap-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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proval of purchaser's credit, purchaser will 
execute such forms and papers as are required 
by the finance factor as evidence of indebted-
ness and the security therefore, and furnish 
co-makers and guarantors, if required. 
According to Mr. Thurmond, the President of appellant 
Wash-A-Matic, the original order form was drawn up to 
get the equipment into operation (R. 76). The "subject 
to financing" portion of the contract was handwritten by 
Thurmond (R. 76). Thurmond testified: 
. . . the contract was subject to financing 
arrangement of financing. He had made appli-
cation for financing but had not been approved 
at that particular time. 
Q. Is that the reason why that phase 
was placed— 
A. That is the reason the phase was put 
in there that if he was unable to arrange his 
financing or if we were unable to arrange the 
financing we would refund his money and he 
wouldn't be under any obligation. 
Exhibit 2-P, a similar order, unsigned by Rupp, was sub-
mitted to Capitol Leasing, a local corporation, to obtain 
financing for Mr. Rupp whereby he could acquire the 
car wash. Capitol Leasing declined the contract a week 
or two after it was submitted (R. 79, 137). Thereafter, 
Thurmond suggested that financing be obtained through 
Mr. Martin of Equipment Leasing in California (R. 73). 
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Mr. Rupp submitted some original credit papers to Mr. 
Martin. Exhibit 3-P was a form prepared by Thurmond 
for submission to Equipment Leasing to obtain financing. 
Exhibit 3-P was never executed by Rupp. Thereafter, 
Equipment Leasing requested additional statements from 
Rupp concerning his financial condition. Rupp thereafter 
supplied Equipment Leasing with additional information 
but never saw a lease agreement nor was he advised as 
to what the terms of any lease would include (R. 139). 
Thurmond asked Livingston Industries, a manufacturer 
of car wash equipment, to go ahead with the equipment 
"on confirmation of the financing." (R. 93). Thurmond 
never saw any lease agreement or proposed lease agree-
ment between Equipment Leasing and respondent (R. 
113). It was up to the Equipment Leasing company to 
purchase the equipment from Wash-A-Matic and lease 
it to Rupp if they were to finance the activity (R. 114). 
Exhibit 3-P was never executed by Equipment Leasing 
and in order for a sale to occur a sale and lease agree-
ment still had to be executed (R. 118). Equipment Leas-
ing never executed a contract to purchase from the ap-
pellant with a view towards leasing back to Rupp (R. 
119). After Rupp had submitted the additional financing 
documents to Equipment Leasing, it requested an addi-
tional $1,000 (R. 141) and Rupp advised Martin that 
he did not have $1,000 at that time (R. 150, 151). Rupp 
was never approached with any form of a lease proposed 
by Equipment Leasing for financing the acquisition of 
the car wash (R. 151). No arrangement was consumated 
with Equipment Leasing. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
The deposition of Ted Martin of Equipment Leas-
ing indicated that he had a commitment for funding 
through Chase-Manhattan Bank (Deposition 9). That 
he never worked out a schedule of payments for Rupp 
(Deposition 12). He indicated that Equipment Leasing 
would actually draw up the lease for the transaction 
between his company and Rupp, but he couldn't say if 
any lease was ever presented to Rupp (Deposition 19). 
He indicated the purchase order would have to be dif-
ferent and that it would reflect that the car wash equip-
ment was sold by Wash-A-Matic to Equipment Leasing 
and leased to Rupp (R. 21). That before they would fi-
nance the matter, the lease would have to be signed by 
their customer (Deposition 33, 34), and that the lease 
would have to be submitted to Chase-Manhattan to ob-
tain the bank's approval (Deposition 20). When the 
$1,000 was not forthcoming from Rupp, the credit ex-
tended by Chase Manhattan expired within 30 days 
(Deposition 11). 
Car wash equipment was shipped by Livingston In-
dustries at appellant's request to Rupp before any fi-
nancing had been arranged and although one or two 
items were initially kept on his property, Rupp refused 
the major shipment (R. 96). Rupp indicated that he, 
Thurmond and Martin subsequently attended a zoning 
hearing in Utah and that Rupp was unable to obtain 
zoning and building approval. Wash-A-Matic thereafter 
returned the equipment to Livingston Industries. The 
trial Court found that the parties entered into the agree-
ment subject to financing and equipment sdection, that 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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respondent was unable to obtain financing locally (R. 
12), that respondent was advised that financing was 
available through Equipment Leasing of California sub-
ject to approval of defendant's credit, acceptance by 
Equipment Leasing Company's bank and the execution 
of a lease acceptable to the bank and Equipment Leas-
ing. That no lease relating to the acquisition of the car 
wash equipment was ever submitted to the respondent 
for execution. The Court concluded as a matter of law 
and fact that there was no binding contract or agree-
ment between the parties (R. 13). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT 
TO THE EFFECT THAT THERE WAS NO 
BINDING CONTRACT OR AGREEMENT 
FORMULATED BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
IS SUSTAINED BY THE EVIDENCE AND 
SUPPORTED BY LAW. 
The respondent submits that the appellant's con-
tention that as a matter of law the findings of the trial 
court are insufficient to sustain the judgment is without 
merit. The order which respondent executed, Exhibit 
1-P, provides two separate legal standards upon which 
to determine whether there was a binding contract. The 
reverse of the contract provides that it was "contingent 
upon the availability to the purchaser of financing as 
set forth on the front of the contract" Further, it pro-
vides that such contracts and agreements as were neces-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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sary to the financial factor would be executed by the pur-
chaser. On the front of the contract in the handwriting 
of John Thurmond, President of the appellant, there 
was written "subject to financing and equipment selec-
tion" and it was noted that the deposit check of Rupp 
was refundable if financing was not arranged. The order 
was prepared by the appellant both in printed form and 
in handwritten form. Under these circumstances, the con-
tract is to be construed in a light most favorable to the 
respondent and against the appellant to the extent that 
there is any ambiguity. In Seal v. Tayco, Inc., 16 Utah 
2d 323, 400 P.2d 503 (1965) this Court observed: 
In addressing this problem, certain prin-
ciples should be kept in mind. The first is that 
in case of uncertainty as to the meaning of the 
contract, it should be construed most strictly 
against its framer, Amsco. A particularized 
application of this well-recognized doctrine is 
that it seems manifestly unfair to permit one 
who formulates a contract to so fashion it as 
to mislead the other party by setting forth a 
clearly apparent promise or representation in 
order to induce acceptance, and then desig-
nedly 'burying' elsewhere in the document, in 
fine print, provisions which purport to limit 
or take away the promise, and/or preclude re-
covery for failure to fulfill it. 
In Skousen v. Smith, 27 Utah 2d 169, 493 P.2d 1003 
(1972) citing numerous prior cases from this Court it 
was stated: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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I t is axiomatic that language in a written in-
strument is interpreted more strongly against 
a scrivener who executes it. 
Appellant may not take the language on the reverse of 
the contract and limit the handwritten language on the 
front of the contract which clearly evidences a condition 
precedent that financing be arranged before the respon-
dent was to be bound. As the trial Court's findings in-
dicate, the parties had considered three separate forms 
of financing: Direct purchase, local bank financing, and 
leasing. If leasing were to be the accepted means of fi-
nancing which was that means most preferred by the 
appellant, it would be necessary for the lessor to purchase 
the property from the appellant through it own factor-
ing and lease to the respondent. No lease agreement 
was ever prepared, which was a condition to such fi-
nancing. Also, the respondent had been refused local 
lease financing. Additionally, it was necessary for the 
parties to agree upon the terms of any financing. In 
Trans Trust S.P.R.L. v. Danubian Trading Co., Ltd., 
[1952] 2 Q.B. 297, the court considered a stipulation 
in a contract for the sale of goods which related to the 
opening by the buyer of a banker's confirmed credit. The 
court observed: 
What is the legal position of such a stipula-
tion? Sometimes it is a condition precedent to 
the formation of a contract, that is, it is a 
condition which must be fulfilled before any 
contract is concluded at all. In those cases the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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stipulation 'subject to the opening of a credit' 
is rather like a stipulation 'subject to contract.' 
If no credit is provided, there is no contract 
between the parties. 
In Associated Inv. Co. v. Cayias, 55 Utah 377, 185 P&c. 
778 (1919) this Court approved the following language, 
"Conditions precedent call for the performance of some 
act or the happening of some event after a contract is 
entered into and upon the performance or happening of 
which its obligations are made to depend." In 17 Am. 
Jur. 2d Contracts § 321, it is observed: 
A condition may be precedent either to 
the existence of a contract or to an obligation 
immediately to perform the contract. A con-
dition precedent to an obligation to perform 
calls for the performance of some act or the 
happening of some event after a contract is 
entered into, upon the performance or happen-
ing of which the obligation to perform im-
mediately is made to depend. 
See also Restatement of Contracts, § 250. Therefore, be-
fore there was any obligation on the part of Rupp to 
pay any money or accept delivery of any goods it was 
necessary that the factoring and financing arrangements 
be worked out. This was acknowledged by Mr. Thur-
mond in his own testimony. 
The appellant cites Wilson v. Gray, 226 P.2d 726 
(Cal. App. 1951) for a contention that the condition 
precedent was met. This case does not support appellant's 
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position. In that case, the parties had a specific contract 
and amount in mind and the actual financing was not 
dependent upon a third party contracting with any of the 
other parties by way of lease or purchase. Even so, the 
Court held there had to be an agreement on the part of 
the prospective creditor to make the loan contemplated. 
By the testimony of Mr. Martin in the instant case be-
fore any loan would in fact be made or an agreement 
to make a loan, as distinct from a mere willingness, there 
had to be prepared a lease agreement which required the 
approval of the Chase-Manhattan Bank. Thus, the terms 
of the lease-sale-re-lease agreement were critical to ob-
taining financing and those terms simply bad not been 
established. Further, before such terms were arrived at, 
the Chase Manhattan Bank foreclosed the availability 
of the funds to Equipment Leasing Company. Addition-
ally, it became apparent that the contract could not be 
financed because of the commercial inability to maintain 
the object of the contract, to wit: the consitruction of 
the carwash, since approval could not be obtained. At 
best, the "subject to financing" provisions on the front 
of the contract merely made Exhibit 1-P an agreement 
to agree. The term "financing" must be considered more 
than merely a willingness to extend credit. In Reese v. 
Walker, 151 N.E.2d 605 (Ohio Mun. 1958) the court held 
that where securing of necessary financing by the pur-
chasers was a condition precedent to proceeding under 
the terms of a contract for purchase, but where the con-
tract did not specify what was meant by necessary fi-
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nancing, that only the purchasers could determine what 
finances they needed. With reference to the term, the 
court observed: 
In the Court's judgment the phrase 'con-
tingent upon securing necessary financing' 
would mean to a layman 'If we can borrow the 
money we need to finance the purchase on 
terms we can repay'. Defendant argues that 
plaintiffs were able to borrow the amount they 
needed and therefore did get 'necessary financ-
ing.' But 'financing' in its ordinary meaning 
connotes more than simply the face amount 
of a loan. I t includes the interest rate, the 
term, the rate of repayment and other terms 
and conditions. I t means a loan on terms that 
the borrower can repay. Under the contract as 
executed only the buyers can determine what 
financing they need. Having signed the con-
tract without specifying what financing was 
'necessary financing', the seller is in no posi-
tion to complain if the buyers state they needed 
a loan with payments as a certain rate. Of 
course, buyers must show good faith. They 
cannot defeat the contract by their own fault. 
They must honestly determine what kind of a 
loan they need and must make a bona fide 
effort to obtain it. This, the evidence shows, 
is what plaintiffs did in the case now before 
us. 
The condition precedent to consummation 
of the contract having been impossible of ful-
fillment, the contract is terminated and plain-
tiffs are entitled to a return of their earnest 
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money deposit as prayed for. Entry may be 
presented accordingly. (Emphasis added). 
Thus, the subject to financing provision of the agree-
ment between appellant and respondent required more 
than just the interest of Equipment Leasing in ultimate-
ly financing the acquisition of a car wash by Rupp. 
Many things were required to be done. 
In Davison v. Robbins, 20 Utah 2d 338, 517 P.2d 
1026 (1973), this Court recognized that under such cir-
cumstances there is no binding contract. In that case 
this Court observed: 
This writing constituted a mere expression of 
a purpose to make a contract in the future, 
for the whole matter was contingent on further 
negotiations. The trial court erred in its con-
clusion that the writing constituted a valid, en-
forceable contract. 
See also, Valcarce v. Bitters, 12 Utah 2d 61, 362 P.2d 
427 (1961). In the instant case the agreement between 
appellant and respondent must be construed againt re-
spondent. This Court has consistently held the facts on 
appeal are to be viewed in a light most favorable to the 
party prevailing below and if any evidence of record 
will support the trial Court's conclusions they should be 
sustained, Coombs v. Perry, 2 Utah 2d 381, 275 P.2d 680 
(1954). The trial Court's Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law being supported by evidence of record, it 
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must be concluded that there was no binding contract 
between appellant and respondent. 
POINT II 
THE APPELLANT'S CONTENTION THAT 
THE SUBJECT TO FINANCING CLAUSE 
WAS EITHER WAIVED OR EXCUSED BY 
RESPONDENT'S CONDUCT CANNOT BE 
RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON AP-
PEAL AND IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE. 
The appellant raises three contentions as to why the 
condition precedent in the agreement between appellant 
and respondent should not govern this appeal. Appel-
lant contends the condition of financing was waived, ex-
cused or an oral contract existed independent of the writ-
ten contract for the purchase of the equipment. An 
examination of the appellant's complaint shows that none 
of these three concepts were plead. An examination of 
the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in-
dicates that no findings or conclusions were made on 
any of these concepts. Consequently, it is obvious that 
appellant is raising each of the three theories for the first 
time on appeal. It has long been the accepted rule in 
this jurisdiction that a position not presented to the trial 
court may not be raised for the first time on appeal. 
State By and Through Its Road Commission v. Larkin, 
27 Utah 2d 295, 495 P.2d 817 (1972); In re Ekker Estate, 
19 Utah 2d 414, 432 P.2d 45 (1967); Ruber v. Deep Creek 
Irrigation Co., 6 Utah 2d 15, 305 P.2d 478 (1956); Drum-
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mond v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., I l l Utah 289, 177 
P.2d 903 (1947). It is therefore submitted that each of 
these contentions should be dismissed as inappropriate 
for this appeal. 
However, respondent further contends that the evi-
dence in the instant case does not justify the applica-
tion of any of these doctrines. The trial Court in Find-
ings 5 through 9 found: 
5. That subsequent to the subscribing to 
the document by the parties, plaintiff and de-
fendant continued negotiations with respect 
to the type and availability of car wash equip-
ment and sought to find financing of the equip-
ment. 
6. That in connection with the negotia-
tions, defendant: 
(a) Contacted his bank; 
(b) Contacted the Capitol Goods Sup-
ply and Leasing Company of Salt 
Lake City; and 
(c) Contacted Equipment Leasing of 
California, at San Bernardino, Cali-
fornia. 
7. Defendant was unable to obtain from 
his bank or Capitol Goods Supply and Leas-
ing Company the necessary financing. 
8. Defendant was advised financing was 
available to him by Equipment Leasing Com-
pany of California subject to approval of de-
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fendant's credit, acceptance by Chase Manhat-
tan Bank, N.A., of New York, New York of 
appropriate documentation, including an ex-
ecuted lease acceptable to the bank. That no 
appropriate documentation, no prepared lease 
nor execution lease was submitted to Chase 
Manhattan Bank. 
9. That a lease relating to the subject 
matter of negotiations was never submitted to 
the defendant for execution by him by any 
financial institution, the plaintiff or any leasing 
company. 
To these findings appellant made no objection. 
Waiver 
In Ahrendt v. Babbitt, 119 Utah 465, 229 P.2d 296 
(1951) this Court recognized that a condition precedent 
to a contract could be waived. In that case, the assignee 
in a particular contract setting had a right to receive par-
ticular consideration but treated the contract as in effect 
without receiving consideration. By analogy a waiver of 
the condition precedent in this case could only be found 
if Mr. Rupp having a right to treat the contract as not 
obligating him until he secured financing went ahead and 
performed the contract without having secured the fi-
nancing. The evidence in this case simply does not sus-
tain a finding of such conduct. In 17 Am. Jur. 2d Con-
tracts 392, it is stated: 
Conditions precedent may be viewed by 
the party in whose favor they are made. The 
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performance of a condition precedent may be 
waived, by the party in whose favor it is stipu-
lated, either expressly or by implication re-
sulting from his acts or conduct. 'Waiver/ 
when used in connection with the required 
performance of a condition, has its usual mean-
ing of a voluntary and intentional relinquish-
ment of a known right. (Emphasis added). 
In the instant case the findings of the Conrt and the evi-
dence clearly indicate there was no intention on the part 
of Mr. Rupp to waive his right to select equipment or 
to secure financing before the contract would become 
binding. He submitted papers to one company to obtain 
financing and was refused. At the request of Thurmond, 
an effort to obtain financing through Equipment Leasing 
was made and the financing was never accomplished. At 
no time did Mr. Rupp ever indicate that he was willing 
to go forward with the transaction until appropriate fi-
nancing had been secured. The appellant attempts to in-
voke the provisions of the agreement that indicate that 
the contract cannot be cancelled "after manufacture be-
gins." However, this language which must be construed 
in harmony with other sections and against the appellant 
if ambiguous merely means that the contract after hav-
ing become fully in effect cannot be cancelled. There was 
no effort made on Mr. Rupp's part to cancel the con-
tract rather the contract never came to fruition since 
financing was never obtained. Under the facts of record, 
it cannot be said that there was a knowing and intention-
al waiver of the condition precedent by Rupp. It was 
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Thurmond who wanted the order evidenced by P-l in 
order to start manufacturing. Although Rupp was anx-
ious to get moving Rupp did not indicate he would pur-
chase without financing. 
Excused 
The appellant contends that the condition precedent 
to respondent's liability under their agreement was ex-
cused by the conduct of respondent. The findings of the 
trial court demonstrate the substantial effort made by 
respondent to obtain financing. The appellant contends 
that respondent did not exercise good faith in his effort 
to obtain financing because he did not advance the $1000 
requested by Equipment Leasing. Nothing could be 
further from the truth. The respondent submitted finan-
cial information to Capitol Goods and Leasing and was 
refused credit (R. 79). Thereafter at Wash-A-Matic's re-
quest, arrangements were made to obtain leasing fi-
nancing through Mr, Martin of Equipment Leasing. Rupp 
supplied initial information. He always indicated a de-
sire to go forward with the project. Martin of Equip-
ment Leasing requested additional information from Rupp 
subsequent to the initial information provided. Rupp 
submitted the additional information (R. 146). Martin 
asked for an additional $1000; Rupp had already de-
posited $200 and his agreement required no more. Rupp 
didn't have $1000 cash and advised Martin of that fact 
and indicated he would see what he could do (R. 151). 
In the meantime, the 30 day credit commitment lapsed 
(Deposition p. 11). However, before any financing could 
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take place bank approval of the lease was necessary 
(Deposition p. 20), and it would be necessary that a new 
purchase order between Wash-A-Matic and Equipment 
Leasing be made out which was never done (Deposition 
p. 21). Wash-A-Matic and Equipment Leasing never did 
what was necessary to consummate the transaction. All 
parties dropped the possibility of financing when build-
ing approval was refused. Rupp, Thurmond and Martin 
all attended a hearing in an effort to overcome the build-
ing permit obstacle but could not do so (R. 142, 154). 
The Restatement of Contracts § 295 provides: 
If a promisor prevents or hinders the oc-
currence of a condition, or the performance of 
a return promise, and the condition would have 
occurred or the performance of the return 
promise been rendered except for such preven-
tion or hinderance, the condition is executed, 
and the actual or threatened nonperformance 
of the return promise does not discharge the 
promisor's du ty , . . . " (emphasis added) 
The evidence and findings of the Court in no way 
support a prevention or hinderance on the part of Rupp, 
rather they show an earnest effort on the part of Rupp 
to do what was necessary to go forward with the con-
templated project. However, all parties to the transac-
tion could not consummate the deal. In Haymore v. Lev-
inson, 8 Utah 2d 66, 328 P.2d 307 (1958) this Court 
applied the principle of the restatement, but the facts 
showed a deliberate and wilful action by a party to pre-
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vent the performance of a contract. The facts of this case 
and the findings of the Court show no comparable con-
duct. 
Oral Contract 
The appellant argues that if the written sales agree-
ment is unenforceable because of a failure to meet the 
condition precedent that there was nevertheless an oral 
contract enforceable by the provisions of Section 70A-2-
201(3) (a), Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
It should be noted that appellant did not plead an 
oral contract or plead for such relief in the alternative 
but rather plead and relied upon the written agreement 
between the parties. The Court made no findings on the 
matter and it appears that appellant is raising the matter 
for the first time on appeal. Even so, appellant's argu-
ment is not sustainable. The referenced section only 
comes into operation when there is "a contract which 
does not satisfy the requirements of subsection (1) of 
70A-2-201." In the instant case, the parties did reduce 
their agreement to writing and under such a condition 
that contract governs the relationship between the par-
ties. The statutory remedy only applies when the parties 
had not otherwise reduced their contract to writing. As 
is noted in Hawkland, Vol. 1, A Transactional Guide to 
the Uniform Commercial Code, 
The fact that a seller manufactures some 
special goods does not prove that the buyer 
requested him to do so. Of course, the excep-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
21 
tion only deprives the buyer of the protection 
of the Statute of Frauds, and he can still 
defeat a fraudulent effort to thrust a non-
existent agreement upon him by showing that 
no contract was made. 
In effect ,the failure of the condition precedent means 
that no contract was in fact made. 
Further, the Record does not support the conclu-
sion that the goods were unique to Rupp's situation. 
Wash-A-Matic had two leads to sell the equipment but 
it did not meet what the potential customers wanted. 
Thereafter, the equipment was shipped back to the man-
ufacturer (R. 100). This is not sufficient evidence of 
specially manufactured goods as w o u l d show special 
peculiarity to the respondent. See, Lee i>. Griffin, 1 BEST 
&S272 (1860). 
POINT III 
RESPONDENT IS NOT LIABLE TO APPEL-
LANT FOR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES OR 
LOSS OF PROFITS. 
Incidental Damages 
The appellant contends that the respondent should 
be liable for incidental damages it incurred as an ag-
grieved seller. This would include the cost of warehousing 
the rejected car wash equipment and freight charges, § 
70A-2-710, Utah Code Annotated 1953 provides for in-
cidental damages, but only where they result from a 
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breach of contract. Since in the instant case there was 
no breach of contract by Rupp, appellant is not entitled 
to hold respondent liable for incidental damages. 
Further, the appellant failed to prove incidental 
damages. In an effort to prove incidental damages appel-
lant offered into evidence Exhibits 5 through 7-P. Con-
trary to appellant's assertion, the court ruled the Exhibits 
inadmissible. With reference to Exhibits 5 and 6-P, the 
Court sustained the objection on the ground of hearsay 
noting: 
T H E COURT: I sustained the objection, 
but I'm certain that I ML has copies of all the 
charges, if we have to we can get them. I will 
sustain it at this time. Maybe if you have any-
thing to indicate that that is sufficient for dam-
ages of what they were charged I will listen 
to it on that basis. 
MR. D A V I E S : I would appreciate, 
Your Honor, having an opportunity — 
T H E COURT: I am not precluding you 
from making a further offer but at this time 
I will sustain the objection. 
With reference to Exhibit 7-P the Court also sustained 
a similar objection stating: 
T H E COURT: I in effect will sustain 
it, but I will reserve ruling. My indication is 
that it shouldn't be received as not the best 
evidence and being hearsay. 
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MR. W E G G E L A N D : Yes, Sir. 
T H E COURT: I would reserve ruling 
on it. If I'm wrong that leaves the burden upon 
Mr. Davies. 
MR. D A V I E S : That's correct, Your 
Honor. I understand that. 
These exhibits were apparently prepared by Livingston, 
Inc. and there was no foundation offered further on the 
part of the appellant as to their preparation. Appellant 
did not further renew its offer of these evidentiary items. 
Under these circumstances, they cannot complain. The 
general rule is stated in 88 ALR 2d 12 at page 124 as 
follows: 
The quite generally prevailing rule deduc-
ible from the cases is that where evidence 
offered and objected to has been excluded 
conditionally or temporarily, it becomes in-
cumbent upon the party who sought to intro-
duce such evidence to renew his effort in that 
respect at a later, appropriate stage of the 
trial by offering the evidence again or at least 
by resuming a line of interrogation directed 
toward getting such evidence into the record; 
and if he fails to so actively renew his efforts 
to introduce the evidence he ordinarily will be 
precluded from contending on appeal that it 
was erroneously excluded or that there was 
error in the court's conditional or temporary 
ruling. 
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See also, State ex rel Simms v. Collier, 93 Idaho 19, 454 
P.2d 56 (1969). The court having made a provisional 
ruling and the appellant having failed to thereafter make 
an appropriate offer of testimony, the appellant cannot 
claim error on appeal. See Mace v. Tingey, 106 Utah 420, 
149P.2d832 (1944). 
Further, the trial Court's ruling was clearly correct. 
Rule 63(13) Utah Rules of Evidence provides for the ad-
mission of business entries "if the judge finds that they 
were made in the regular course of a business at or about 
the time of the act . . . and that the sources of informa-
tion from which made and the method and circum-
stances of their preparation were such as to indicate their 
timsitworthiness." In the instant case, no foundational 
testimony was offered as to the preparation of the rec-
ords or even to show that Livingston in fact prepared 
them. They were merely copies of matters sent to Wash-
A-Matic. There was no showing that they were in fact 
business records kept in the regular course of business. 
The purposes of Rule 63 (13) Utah Rules of Evidence are 
to leave it to the judge to determine whether the sources 
of information upon which the records are based reflect 
trustworthiness. Comment, Rule 63(13) Uniform Rules 
of Evidence in Jones, Evidence, 6th ed. Vol. 4 page 420. 
Invoices that do not have sufficient foundation as to their 
authenticity are not properly admitted. United States v. 
Rappy, 157 F.2d 964 (2nd Cir. 1946); Annotation 21 ALR 
2d 773. In the latter Annotation, it is noted at page 776: 
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While it is well settled that these statutes 
should be liberally interpreted so as to do away 
with the anachronistic rules which gave rise to 
their need and at which they were aimed, there 
must apparently be some verification and au-
thentication to make documentary evidence 
sought to be introduced thereunder admissible. 
See also, Polasky and Paulson, Business Entries, From 
Common Law to The New Uniform Rules of Evidence 
(With a Glance at The Utah Development) 4 Utah Law 
Review 327 (1955). Consequently, appellant's claim for 
incidental damages must be rejected. 
Loss of I '}mfits 
Respondent acknowledges that under Section 70A-2 
708(2) Utah Code Annotated, 1953, that loss of profits 
may be an appropriate measure of damages in some cases. 
However, before the appellant would be entitled to loss 
of profits it would be necessary that there be a breach 
of binding contract. Since the evidence supports the trial 
Court's determination that there never was an obligation 
on the part of the respondent to accept goods from the 
appellant the appellant is not entitled to any damages 
for loss of profits, 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence when viewed in a light most favorable 
to the trial Court's ruling clearly supports the Findings 
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and Judgment of the trial Court. The arguments raised 
by the appellant on appeal, some for the first time, in 
no way justify reversing the Findings and Judgment of 
the trial Court. This Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GERALD G. GUNDRY 
610 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorney for Respondent 
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